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Abstract 
Pervasive credit constraints have been seen as major sources of slow growth in developing 
economies. This paper clarifies a mechanism through which an inefficient financial system can 
reduce productivity growth. Using a two-sector model, second, we examine the implications for 
employment and the distribution of income. Both classical and Keynesian versions of the model 
are considered; saving decisions are central in the classical version while firms’ investment and 
pricing decisions take center stage in the Keynesian version. We find that, although boosting the 
asymptotic rate of growth, a relaxation of credit constraints may reduce the share of the formal 
sector, increase inequality and underemployment, and have little or no effect on the medium-run 
rate of growth.  
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1. Introduction 
Poor financial systems and pervasive credit constraints have been sees as major sources of 
slow growth in developing economies. Mexico is a striking example, and the Mexican 
experience provides the primary motivation for the analysis in this paper; the general 
argument, however, may apply more widely. 
The Mexican economy has gone through a series of structural reforms since the 
1980s. It has been opened to foreign trade and capital flows, state participation in economic 
affairs has been significantly diminished, and an export-led growth strategy has displaced 
the earlier import-substitution strategy. Each new round of reforms was introduced with 
promises of high and sustained growth. The results have been disappointing. The economic 
growth predicted by the reformers has not materialized. Exports have increased but not 
yielded growth in the economy as a whole. Macroeconomic stability in the form of low 
inflation and reductions in the fiscal deficit may have been achieved, but even these 
achievements should be seen in the context of severe crises in 1982-1983, 1986, 1995, and 
2008-2009; Lustig (2001) presents an early assessment of the economic shift; Moreno-Brid 
and Ros (2009), Hanson (2010) and (2012), and Ros (2013a) and (2015) are more recent 
studies. 
The literature on Mexican slow growth has two broad strands. The dominant strand 
points to stagnant total factor productivity. An alternative view regards the low rate of 
capital accumulation as the most important proximate cause of the sluggishness, and 
considers low productivity growth to be a consequence of low capital accumulation. Both 
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strands agree that many firms, especially medium and small enterprises, have experienced 
significant credit constraints and that those constraints have been an important reason for 
slow growth. In the dominant view, inefficient financial systems contribute directly to low 
productivity growth; Hanson (2010), and Kehoe and Ruhl (2010), Tinoco-Zermeño and 
Venegas-Martínez (2014), Bolio et. al. (2014). In the alternative view, credit constraints, 
may have contributed to the low rates of capital formation, with derived effects on 
productivity growth; Moreno-Brid, Rivas, and Santamaría (2005), Moreno-Brid and Ros 
(2009, 2010), Ros (2013a, 2015).1 
This paper contributes a theoretical perspective on the links between credit 
constraints, labor productivity and macroeconomic growth. We clarify one mechanism 
through which an inefficient financial system can reduce macroeconomic growth. Using a 
two-sector model, second, we examine the implications of an improvement in the financial 
system for employment and the distribution of income. Two versions of the model are 
considered, a classical version and a Keynesian version. Saving decisions are central in the 
classical version while firms’ investment and pricing decisions take center stage in the 
Keynesian version. We find that a relaxation of credit constraints may improve productivity 
growth in the modern sector and boost the asymptotic rate of growth of output. With a slow 
convergence to the asymptotic state, however, the medium-run effects may be more 
important, and significant medium-run effects require a positive, direct influence of 
financial conditions on firms’ investment and pricing/output decisions; this direct influence 
is absent in the classical version of the model. We also find that, if not accompanied by 
                                                            
1 The distinction is one of degree. The alternative approach does not dismiss productivity issues, and the 
dominant view acknowledges low investment as part of the explanation of the lackluster economic growth 
(e.g. Hanson 2012, p. 8-9).  
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other measures, the alleviation of credit constraints may reduce the share of the formal 
sector and increase inequality and underemployment. Thus, without taking sides in the 
larger debate about the fundamental reasons for the ‘Mexican morass’, we show that the 
direct effects of credit constraints on accumulation are crucial and that additional policies 
may be needed if the benefits from alleviating the credit crunch are to be reaped by the 
Mexicans who need them the most. 
Despite the emphasis on credit constraints in the applied literature, there has been 
little theoretical work. To the best of our knowledge Gelos and Werner (1999) is the only 
contribution on credit constraints and growth in Mexico which, although largely empirical, 
contains some theoretical considerations. Their model, however, fails to take into account 
the coexistence of advanced and backwards sectors. By contrast, our model incorporates the 
existence of a large informal sector, and firm-level differences with respect to productivity 
and credit constraints are at the center of our analysis. 
The formal-informal distinction and the presence of underemployment in the 
informal sector are accepted features of developing economies like Mexico. Indeed, there is 
a debate on whether the large levels of informality are cause or consequence of the 
Mexican slow growth; the presence of informality is not in dispute, however, and all 
participants in the debate deplore the large levels of informality, whether it is seen as cause 
(OCDE 2012) or as consequence (Ros 2013a). 
Our approach has obvious affinities with the literatures on dual and dependent 
economies (see Temple (2005) and Ros (2013b) for surveys). The informal sector should 
not be identified with agriculture. The share of agriculture has declined significantly in 
Mexico, but the decline has been accompanied by a “massive increase in underemployment 
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in the tertiary sectors of the economy” (Ros 2000, p. 104; Moreno-Brid and Ros 2009, p. 
234). It is important to note, too, that the informal sector is not a self-contained subsistence 
sector, as in simple versions of the Lewis model. Informal production is market-oriented, 
and low levels of demand from the formal sector reduce informal-sector income. The model 
in Razmi et al. (2012) comes closest to the one in this paper. We extend this model by 
introducing credit constraints and endogenous changes in productivity; to keep the analysis 
tractable, we simplify the analysis by assuming constant returns to scale in the informal 
sector and fixed consumption shares.2   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines some stylized facts and 
provides a selective survey of the applied literature on credit constraints in the Mexican 
economy. Section 3 analyzes the effects of credit constraints on technical change in the 
modern sector. Section 4 presents a two-sector model with financial constraints in the 
modern sector. Sections 5 and 6 analyze the implications of the model using classical and 
Keynesian closures, respectively. Section 7 contains a few concluding comments. 
 
2. Economic Growth and Financial Constraints in Contemporary Mexico 
2.1 Mexican economic performance 
The structural reforms after 1982 have failed to boost economic growth. Using 
World Bank data we obtain that the average growth rate of per capita GDP in 1961-1981 
was 3.75% while the 1982-2015 average, by contrast, is a strikingly low 0.58%. 
                                                            
2  The relative price of the informal good (the real exchange rate) is a key variable in Razmi et al. With fixed 
expenditure shares, this relative price no longer plays the same role as an important component of a strategy 
for growth. 
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Not surprisingly, virtually all scholars and policy makers agree that the results have 
been disappointing. There is also widespread agreement that although credit for 
consumption and housing has increased, finance for productive projects is difficult to 
obtain, and financial constraints have been an important reason for slow growth. According 
to Kehoe and Ruhl (2010, p. 2001) “[t]he most popular set of theories for Mexico´s 
stagnation focuses on its inefficient financial system and lack of contract enforcement”.3 
Indeed, in 2013-2014 legal reforms involving changes in more than 30 laws with the 
explicit purpose of improving access to finance were carried out. Their results are still to be 
seen. 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage 
of GDP for the period 1990-2015. This variable is commonly used in the literature as an 
indicator of financial constraints, and the figure includes data for other Latin American 
countries. Mexico has the lowest ratio among these countries; the average for the whole 
period was 21.7%. There has been some progress, and the ratio increased from 17.4% in 
1990 to 32.7% in 2015. To put this rise in perspective, however, the only other Latin 
American OECD member, Chile, saw an increase from 45.3% in 1990 to 110.9% in 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
3  Kehoe and Ruhl question this emphasis on the financial system, noting that fast-growing China also had a 
poorly functioning financial system (p. 1011). 
6 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/), drawing on International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics and data files, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. 
“Domestic credit to private sector” is defined by the World Bank as financial resources provided to 
the private sector by financial corporations, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity 
securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment.  
 
 
The literature suggests that the lack of credit from the banking system has been 
particularly important in Mexico; Mantey de Anguiano (2007), Haber (2005) and (2009). 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the domestic bank credit to the private sector as percentage 
of GDP for the years 1990-2015. Again, for comparative purposes we include the evolution 
of the same variable in the only other Latin American OECD member, Chile. The figure 
confirms the low level of bank lending in Mexico. In the early 1990s the ratio was around 
30%. It then fell steadily, reaching a low of 12.1% in 2001, before recovering to 24.5% in 
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2015. The average for the whole period was 19%. In Chile, by contrast, the average was 
61%, and the ratio went from 44.2% in 1990 to 81.7% in 2015. 
 
Figure 2. Domestic Credit to Private Sector by Banks (% of GDP) 
Source: World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/), drawing on International Monetary Fund, International 
Financial Statistics and data files, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. The World Bank defines 
“Domestic credit to private sector given by banks” as financial resources provided to the private sector by 
other depository corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks), such as through loans, 
purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for 
repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. 
 
 
 
The data in Figures 1 and 2 do not distinguish between credit to firms and credit for 
consumption, and there is a broad consensus credit that constraints mainly affect firms 
rather than consumption. Using data from the quarterly “Encuesta de evaluación coyuntural 
del mercado crediticio” [Quarterly Survey on the State of the Credit Market] carried out by 
the Mexican Central Bank, figure 3 shows the proportion of firms using bank credit.4  From 
                                                            
4 Beginning in 2009 the survey started asking about “new” banking credit. During 2009 both the Old and the 
New Survey questions overlapped. We present both data outcomes. 
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1998 to 2009 on average only 29.4% of the firms surveyed used banking credit, and the 
average fell to 24.4% in the period from 2009 to 2016. 
 
Figure 3. Mexican firms which used banking credit (%) 
Source: “Encuesta de evaluación coyuntural del mercado crediticio”, Banco de México 
 
 
2.2. Microeconomic evidence 
Several contributions have examined the effect of credit constraints on industrial growth in 
developing countries. They typically find that the size distribution of firms is characterized 
by a “missing middle”: most firms are very small and a very small number of firms are very 
large, and the vast majority of smaller firms face acute credit constraints, due to lack of 
collateral, among other reasons. The findings suggests that credit constraints may be an 
important constraint on industrial growth; Banerjee and Duflo (2014), Bigsten et al. (2003), 
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Galindo and Schiantarelli (2003), Harrison and McMillan (2003), Hericourt and Poncet 
(2007). 
A number of studies consider the reasons why lenders lend so little for productive 
projects. Bergoeing et al. (2002) compare Chilean and Mexican bankruptcy laws; Haber 
(2005) and Haber et al. (2008) focus on the bank privatization process; Mántey de 
Anguiano (2007) points out that banks make good profits by buying government bonds and 
engaging in the derivatives market. Haber (2009) offers evidence to suggest that there is 
little lending because of the oligopolistic banking system and because of the difficulties 
lenders face in seizing assets from borrowers, if the latter default; Haber and Mussachio 
(2012) offer a detailed study of the impact of foreign banks entry in Mexico; Tinoco-
Zermeño, Venegas-Martínez, and Torres-Preciado (2014) examine the effect of inflation on 
low rates of bank credit; Chavarín (2015) rejects the idea that low lending is due to 
problems associated with borrowers who fail to pay back on time. 
Other contributions focus on the distributional dimension of credit constraints and offer 
evidence and/or explanations of why small and medium size firms are more credit 
constrained than large ones; Garrido and Prior (2007), Lecuona (2009), Clavelina (2013), 
Padilla-Pérez and Fenton (2013). Relatedly, some contributions have focused on the impact 
of credit constraints on poverty and informality; Carreón, di Giannatele and López (2007), 
Niño-Zarazua (2013), Bruhn (2013), Bruhn and Love (2014). Contributions on the gender 
dimension of credit constraints can also be found; using quasi-experimental data Bruhn and 
Love (2011) examine how easing credit constraints affects entrepreneurship, employment 
and income of men and women. 
10 
 
 None of the above studies directly address the key issues in the growth debate. The 
contributions by Villalpando (2014) and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) are more relevant 
in this respect. Villalpando offers evidence for the negative effect of financial constraints 
on productivity. McKenzie and Woodruff show that a relaxation of capital constraints can 
have positive and significant effects on profits. 
 The literature on investment effects is limited too. The above-mentioned study by 
Gelos and Warner (1999) examines whether cash flows affected capital expenditures in 
manufacturing firms from 1984 to 1994; following the famous methodology introduced by 
Fazzari et al. (1988) in which a positive relationship between cash flows and investment is 
an (indirect) indication that credit constraints are deterring investment. Gelos and Werner 
indeed find that cash flows are significantly related with capital expenditures. Similarly, 
Sánchez (2001) finds that cash flows had a significant effect on investment in 
manufacturing establishments during 1984-1999. Castañeda (2003) compares the 
relationship of cash flows and investment before and after the 1995 crisis, finding that, 
“contrary to prior expectations” (p. 226) the sensitivity of investment with respect to cash 
flows was reduced after the crisis; this result, however, is not that surprising once it is noted 
that the dataset used consists of large enterprises whose “network structure may have 
reduced agency problems and helped firms to retain their access to external sources of 
financing” (p. 227). 
Credit constraints have become harsher since the mid-1990s (Moreno-Brid and Ros 
2009; Haber et al. 2008), and their impact in this more recent period is studied by Cotler 
and Woodruff (2008), Love and Sánchez (2009), and Gómez-Ramírez (2015). Cotler and 
Woodruff (2008) examine the effect of micro-lending on physical capital investment and 
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other measures of the firm´s performance. Overall, a positive and significant relationship 
between obtaining a loan and investment in fixed assets is found. The study uses quasi-
experimental data that include both treatment and control groups of similar enterprises, but 
the focus is on small retailers in suburban areas of Mexico City that may not be 
representative of the whole country; Cotler and Woodruff are aware of the scope of their 
findings (p. 848). 
 Love and Sánchez (2009) examine the existence of credit constraints in rural areas 
of Mexico. They find evidence that loans to credit constrained agents increase both the 
number of agents making investment and the quantities of investment. The findings are 
based on surveys from 1999 (representative at the regional level) and 2001 (representative 
at the national level). Importantly, however, the study is confined to the rural sector, and 
about 75% of Mexicans live in urban areas. 
 Using nationally representative, establishment level data for the years 2005 and 
2009-2010, Gómez-Ramírez (2015) finds that capital accumulation has been negatively 
affected by credit constraints. Using a bivariate probit model to control for the endogeneity 
of credit constraints, credit constraints reduced the likelihood of investing by 48% in 2005 
and by 38% in 2009-2010.  
 
3. Credit constraints and technical change 
The microeconomic evidence supports the significance of credit constraints at the firm 
level. But firm-level evidence should be interpreted with care. It is not obvious why firm-
12 
 
level credit constraints would affect the average growth rate of productivity.5 Misallocation 
of investment can reduce the average level of productivity if low-productivity firms survive 
because credit constraints prevent the expansion of more efficient competitors. The growth 
rate of productivity could be affected, too, if credit constraints reduce aggregate investment 
in R&D and/or produce in inefficient allocation of R&D spending. Large firms typically do 
not face significant credit constraints, however, and it seems unlikely that formal R&D 
spending would have played a significant role in small and medium sized Mexican firms, 
even if these firms had not been credit constrained. While not denying this channel, we 
therefore examine a different mechanism:  the average level of productivity suffers if credit 
constraints prevent investment and production from moving to the most productive firms; 
the growth of average productivity is affected because innovations represent improvements 
relative to a base level of technology, and the base level depends on average productivity.  
 
3.1. Innovation and diffusion 
Consider an economy with a large number of firms, each having a Leontief production 
function with capital and labor as inputs. Capital productivity, ߪ, is constant across firms 
and over time. By contrast, labor productivity, ܣ௜௧, is firm specific and increases over time: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ min	ሼߪ݇௜௧, ܣ௜௧݈௜௧ሽ     (1) 
where ݕ௜௧, ݇௜௧ and ݈௜௧ denote firm ݅´s output, capital stock and labor input at time ݐ.  
                                                            
5 An influential literature (not specifically about the Mexican economy) has discussed whether or not credit 
constrains affect growth through its effect on overall productivity; Aghion et. al. (2005). Relatedly, influential 
papers on the impact of monetary policy on the credit supply in the USA acknowledge that substantial firm-
level credit constraints do not necessarily imply substantial reductions in the overall economic activity; 
Kashyap and Stein (2000), Khwaja and Mian (2008). 
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A firm´s productivity is either ‘low’ or ‘high’. Firms that innovate in period ݐ 
achieve high productivity; firms that do not innovate in period ݐ use the base technology. 
Formally, we assume that ܣ௜௧ ൌ exp	ሺܽ௧ ൅ ܾ௜௧ሻ or, equivalently, 
lnܣ௜௧ ൌ ܽ௧ ൅ ܾ௜௧               (2) 
where ܽ௧ represents the base technology in period t and ܾ௜௧ ∈ ሼ0, ܾሽ captures innovation by 
the firm. We assume that all firms share the same base technology ܽ௧, independently of 
their individual histories of innovation. 
Innovations -- the stochastic variables ܾ௜௧ -- occur randomly, and we take them to be 
independent across firms and serially independent for any given firm; that is, ܾ௜௧ is 
independent of ௝ܾఛ if ݆݅ ് ݆߬. Each firm has a probability ݔ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ of innovating in any 
given period. Thus,  
ܾ௜௧ ൌ ቄܾ0
with	probability	ݔ
				with	probability	1 െ ݔ              (3) 
The base technology in period ݐ ൅ 1 depends positively on the average productivity 
in period ݐ. Formally, we assume that 
ܽ௧ାଵ ൌ ܽ௧ ൅ ݂ሾlnܣ௧ െ ܽ௧ሿ ൅ ݃ൣܭ෡൧;  ݂ᇱ ൐ 0,  1 ൐ ݃ᇱ ൒ 0           (4) 
where ܣ௧ ൌ
∑ ஺೔೟௟೔೟೔
∑ ௟೔೟೔
.  The dynamics of the base technology and the f-function, in particular, 
are central to our argument.  
 The ݂ሾ∙ሿ function represents diffusion, but in a broad sense that goes beyond the 
passive adoption of existing techniques. The base technology ܽ௧ changes over time as firms 
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learn from and combine innovations from the previous period.6 The process of combination 
depends on the visibility of the innovations, and the visibility depends on the extent of their 
use. If each firm observes the technologies used in the previous period by a sample of m 
other firms and a fraction r of these other firms has innovated, the firm will learn from and 
combine rm innovations. The higher the fraction r, the more new information is obtained 
and the larger will be the increase in base productivity. The probability that a firm will 
become part of the sample depends on its size, and the proportion of output produced by 
innovating firms is reflected in the difference between average and base technology, that is, 
in  lnܣ௧ െ ܽ௧ . The difference is equal to b if all production takes place in innovating firms, 
but equal to zero if all production takes place in non-innovating firms.  Thus, we take the 
speed of diffusion-induced technical change to be an increasing function of ሺlnܣ௧ െ ܽ௧ሻ. 
The second term on the right hand side of equation (4) -- the ݃ሾ∙ሿ function -- 
represents traditional notions of learning by doing (or learning by investment), as 
exemplified by Kaldor´s technical progress function and Verdoorn´s law. This term 
captures a causal link from accumulation to productivity growth; see Skott and Larudee 
(1998) and Ros (2013a, chapter 1) for an application to Mexico.7 
 
3.2. Credit constraints and productivity 
The qualitative effect of credit constraints on aggregate productivity growth can be seen 
most clearly in a stylized setting in which capital depreciates fully after one period and in 
                                                            
6 This combination and refinement of different innovations may (but need not) produce a new base 
productivity that exceeds the productivity of the innovating firms in the previous period (that is, we may have 
ܽ௧ାଵ ൐ ܽ௧ ൅ ܾ). 
7  The large literature on Verdoorn’s law includes Dixon and Thirlwall (1975), McCombie (1982) and 
Setterfield (1997). 
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which a firm knows, when it makes its investment decision in period t, whether it will be an 
innovator in period ݐ ൅ 1. It would be straightforward to relax the second assumption and 
assume merely that the firm receives an imperfect signal about its probability of successful 
innovation. A relaxation of the first assumption would complicate the analysis but not, we 
believe, affect the qualitative conclusions. 
We consider two polar cases with respect to the financial system. In the first case 
firms cannot obtain external funding; there are no financial markets, and each firm’s 
investment is constrained by its own operating profits. In the second case financial markets 
are perfect, and finance flows to the innovating firms; non-innovating firms, which would 
have low profitability, do not invest.  
 Consider first the case without financial markets. If all firms invest the same 
proportion of their profits, the proportion ݔ of the total capital stock ܭ௧ will be operated by 
innovating firms; the fraction 1 െ ݔ will be operated by non-innovating firms and, 
assuming a uniform utilization rate of capital, the average labor productivity in the modern 
sector is given by8 
ܣ௧ ൌ
∑ ܣ௜௧݈௜௧௜
∑ ݈௜௧௜
ൌ
ݑߪܭ௧
ݔݑߪܭ௧
expሺܽ௧ ൅ ܾሻ
൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻݑߪܭ௧expሺܽ௧ሻ
 
 ൌ ୣ୶୮	ሺ௔೟ା௕ሻ௫ାሺଵି௫ሻୣ୶୮	ሺ௕ሻ 
Thus,  
lnܣ௧ ൌ ܽ௧ ൅ ܾ െ ln	ሺ1 ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔሻሺ݁ݔ݌ ܾ െ 1ሻሻ  
and, for small values of ܾ, 
lnAt  ൎ ܽ௧ ൅ ݔܾ            (5) 
                                                            
8  By assumption, the distribution of innovations is random across the population of firms: the fraction ݔ of all 
firms innovates in any one period, and innovation in any one period is independent of past innovation history. 
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Using equations (4) and (5) we now get an expression for the growth rate of average 
productivity in the case in which firms cannot obtain external funding (using ‘hats’ to 
denote growth rates):  
ܣመ௧ ൌ ln ൬
ܣ௧ାଵ
ܣ௧
൰ ൌ lnܣ௧ାଵ െ lnܣ௧ ൌ ܽ௧ାଵ െ ܽ௧  
or 
ܣመ௧ ൌ ݂ሾݔܾሿ ൅ ݃ൣܭ෡൧       (6) 
The derivation of (6) assumed uniform rates of saving and utilization. The analysis can be 
generalized to the case in which innovating firms have higher rates of saving and 
utilization; as shown in Appendix A, the results are similar. 
The expression for the growth rate of productivity in equation (6) changes if perfect 
capital markets ensure that all investment goes to innovating firms (which offer a higher 
rate of profit). Given the assumption of full depreciation, we now have that ܭ௧
௛௜௚௛ ൌ ܭ௧ and 
ܭ௧௟௢௪ ൌ 0. Using the same steps as in the derivation of equation (6), we obtain the growth 
rates of productivity and employment under perfect financial markets: 
ܣመ௧ ൌ ݂ሾܾሿ ൅ ݃ൣܭ෡൧               (7) 
Comparing equations (6) and (7), there is an unambiguous increase in productivity growth 
when the credit constraints are removed.  
The analysis has focused on two polar cases with respect to the financial system 
(complete self-financing and perfect capital markets). The intuition, however, is 
straightforward, and the qualitative result is likely to be robust: credit constraints and poor 
financial markets reduce the share of high-productivity, innovating firms in total capital and 
output, and the share of innovating firms in turn affects the visibility of innovations. The 
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intuition and likely robustness suggest a general specification in which productivity growth 
depends on ݍ, where ݍ is an indicator of the allocative efficiency of the financial system (an 
inverse indicator of the degree of credit constraints). Formally, 
ܣመ௧ ൌ ݂ሾݍሿ ൅ ݃ൣܭ෡൧; ݂´ ൐ 0, 1 ൐ ݃´ ൒ 0              (8) 
 
4.  A dual economy 
Assuming that credit constraints affect productivity growth, the key questions concern the 
implications for investment, modern sector employment and aggregate economic growth.  
We use a two-sector model in which a modern, formal sector interacts with an informal 
sector to analyze these issues.  
Let ேܻ and ெܻ denote output in the informal and modern sector. Taking the price of 
the modern good as the numeraire, real output (in terms of modern goods) is given by  
௧ܻ ൌ ݌ே௧ ேܻ௧ ൅ ெܻ௧     (9) 
where ݌ே௧ is the relative price of the informal good. 
We assume that the total labor force Lt grows at the exogenous rate ݊: 
ܮ෠௧ ൌ ݊                 (10) 
 
4.1. The modern sector 
The modern sector produces a tradable good which can be exported or used for domestic 
investment or consumption. The technology in this sector is as described in section 3. 
Disregarding labor hoarding and using ܭ௧ ൌ ∑ ݇௜௧௜ , ܮெ௧ ൌ ∑ ݈௜௧௜  and ܣ௧ ൌ
∑ ஺೔೟௟೔೟೔
௅ಾ೟
 to denote 
aggregate capital, aggregate employment and average labor productivity, equation (1) 
implies that  
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ெܻ௧ ൌ ݑ௧ߪܭ௧ ൌ ܣ௧ܮெ௧      (11) 
where ut is the average utilization rate of capital. Labor productivity in the sector grows in 
accordance with equation (8). 
 
4.2.   The informal sector and the labor supply 
Workers who fail to get modern-sector jobs move into the informal sector, that is,  
ܮே௧ ൌ ܮ௧ െ ܮெ௧                         (12) 
where ܮ௜௧ denotes employment in sector ݅. This assumption, however, does not imply full 
employment. Workers in the modern sector earn higher wages, and the informal sector is 
characterized by underemployment: informal workers may be employed only a fraction of 
the time; obvious examples include street vendors with few customers, or day laborers who 
do not find jobs every day.  
The informal sector produces a non-tradable consumption good using labor as the 
only input; this assumption represents a stylized version of the fact the informal sector has 
lower capital intensity than the formal sector. The production function is linear. If ܧ௧ 
denotes the effective employment, production in the informal sector is given by: 
ேܻ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ ൌ ݁௧ܮே௧ ൌ ݁௧(ܮ௧ െ ܮெ௧)    (13) 
where ݁௧ ൌ
ா೟
௅ಿ೟
൑ 1 is the effective employment rate. Assuming, for simplicity, that all 
income in the informal sector goes to workers,9 the average ‘wage’ in terms of modern 
goods is  
߱ே௧ ൌ ݁ே௧݌ே௧                          (14) 
                                                            
9 The Mexican informal sector is large and it may include small scale firms with owners and workers. For 
present purposes, however, we are mainly interested in the influence of informal-sector incomes on formal-
sector wages. This influence does not depend on the absence of profit income in the informal sector, and the 
assumption simplifies the exposition. 
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4.3. Demand structure, wages and profits 
In Mexico, as in most developing economies, workers save little. Thus, we assume that all 
income in the informal sector is spent on consumption, that the same applies to wage 
income in the formal sector, and that a fraction of formal-sector profits is saved. Formally, 
ܵ௧ ൌ ݏߨ௧ ெܻ௧               (15) 
where S, s, and ߨ denote private savings, average saving rate out of profits, and the profits 
share of the modern sector, respectively. 
Domestic consumption is split between informal and formal goods. To simplify, we 
assume that a fixed proportion, 1 െ ߙ, of domestic consumption expenditure goes to the 
informal good (corresponding to a Cobb-Douglas utility function). The informal good is 
used only for domestic consumption, and we have the following equilibrium condition for 
the informal sector:  
݌ே௧ ேܻ௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߙሻሺ݌ே௧ ேܻ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݏߨ௧ሻ ெܻ௧ሻ               (16) 
or, using (11)-(14), 
݌ே௧ ேܻ௧ ൌ ߱ே௧ሺܮ െ ܮெ௧ሻ ൌ
ଵିఈ
ఈ
ሾሺ1 െ ݏߨ௧ሻݑ௧ߪܭ௧ሿ            (17) 
Dividing through by ܣ௧ሺܮ௧ െ ܮெ௧ሻ and using ܣ௧ܮெ௧ ൌ ݑ௧ߪܭ௧, yields an expression for 
average income in the informal sector: 
ఠಿ೟
஺೟
ൌ ଵିఈఈ ሺ1 െ ݏߨ௧ሻ ቀ
௨೟ఙ௄೟
஺೟௅೟ି௨೟ఙ௄೟
ቁ ൌ ଵିఈఈ ሺ1 െ ݏߨ௧ሻ ቆ
ೠ೟഑಼೟
ಲ೟ಽ೟
ଵିೠ೟഑಼೟ಲ೟ಽ೟
ቇ  
or  
 ఠಿ೟஺೟ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݏߨ௧ሻݒ ቂ
௨೟ఙ௄೟
஺೟௅೟
ቃ; ݒᇱ ൐ 0             (18) 
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The formal sector is the prime source of demand for informal goods and, thereby, 
the determination of average incomes in the sector (equations (17)-(18)). Conditions in the 
informal sector, in turn, influence wage setting and profitability in the formal sector. The 
wage in the modern sector typically exceeds the average income in the informal sector, and 
we assume that 
߱ெ௧ ൌ ߤ߱ே௧;    ߤ ൐ 1                (19) 
where ߱ெ is the real wage (in terms of modern goods) per worker in the modern sector and 
ߤ represents the wage premium. Thus, we have10 
ߨ௧ ൌ ߨ ቂ
ఠಿ೟
஺೟
ቃ;    ߨᇱ ൏ 0             (20) 
Combining (18) and (20), the profit share in the modern sector and the informal-
sector equilibrium wage can be written as functions of  ௨௄஺௅ 	and	ݏ:
11  
ߨ ൌ ߮ ቂ௨௄஺௅ , ݏቃ;  ߮ଵ ൏ 0, ߮ଶ ൐ 0                    (21) 
ఠಿ
஺ ൌ ߰ ቂ
௨௄
஺௅ , ݏቃ;  ߰ଵ ൐ 0,߰ଶ ൏ 0           (22) 
  Equilibrium in the informal sector ensures that the formal sector will also be in 
equilibrium if the aggregate IS condition holds. This condition requires that 
ܫ ൌ ܵ ൅ ሺܶ െ ܩሻ ൅ ሺܯ െ ܺሻ             (23) 
                                                            
10  The general specification in equation (20) does not require a constant wage premium. The wage aspirations 
and bargaining strength of formal-sector workers arguably depend positively on the profit share; that is, we 
may have ߤ ൌ ߤሾߨሿ	with	ߤᇱ ൐ 0. The average profit share in the modern sector is given by ߨ௧ ൌ 1 െ
ఠಾ೟
஺೟
, and 
using equation (19) and the implicit function theorem, the profit share will be a decreasing function of  ఠಿ೟஺೟ , as 
in (20). 
11  From equations (18) and (20) we have 
ఠಿ೟
஺೟
ൌ ቀ1 െ ݏߨ௧ ቂ
ఠಿ೟
஺೟
ቃቁ ݒ ቂ௨೟௄೟஺೟௅೟ቃ  
Using the implicit function theorem, ఠಿ೟஺೟  is increasing in	
௨೟௄೟
஺೟௅೟
 and decreasing in s. From (20) it now follows 
that the profit share is decreasing in	௨೟௄೟஺೟௅೟ and increasing in s. 
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where I, S, T, G, M and X denote investment, private saving, taxes, government 
consumption, imports and exports, all measured in terms of formal goods. The equilibrium 
condition for the informal (non-traded) good is independent of the trade balance, given the 
level of formal sector output. It would be affected, however, by taxes that influence 
disposable incomes as well as by any government consumption that is not exclusively 
targeting the modern, traded good. To avoid these complications, we assume that taxation 
takes the form of a sales tax on the formal sector and that government consumption 
contains no informal goods. 
 We examine the properties of two versions of this economic system, a classical 
version and a Keynesian version. 
 
5.  A classical closure 
In this classical version there is full utilization of capital, the profit share in the modern 
sector is given by equation (21), and investment is determined passively by saving, that is, 
by the right hand side of the IS relation (23). To get a determinate outcome, the model is 
closed by introducing assumptions about the budget deficit and the trade balance. Taking 
the sum of the government budget and the trade account to be proportional to the capital 
stock, the IS condition can be written 
ܭሶ ൅ ߜܭ ൌ ܫ ൌ ܵ ൅ ߬ܭ            (24) 
where ߜ denotes the capital depreciation rate, and ߬ܭ ൌ ܶ െ ܩ ൅ܯ െ ܺ.  The special case 
in which both the government budget and the trade account are balanced – perhaps a 
reasonable long-run constraint – corresponds to setting  ߬ ൌ 0 . 
Equations (11), (15), and (24) imply that 
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ܭ෡ ൌ ௌ௄ െ ߜ ൌ ݏߨݑߪ െ ሺߜ െ ߬ሻ            (25) 
and, using equation (21) and u=1, we obtain a general expression for the equilibrium 
accumulation rate: 
ܭ෡ ൌ ܨ ቂ ௄஺௅ , ݏ, ߬ቃ;  ܨଵ ൏ 0, ܨଶ ൐ 0, ܨଷ ൐ 0                    (26)
12 
The mechanisms and intuition behind equation (26) are straightforward. An increase in the 
ratio of capital to the total labor supply in efficiency units implies an increase in the share 
of modern-sector workers. As a result, the demand for informal goods will rise and be 
spread over a smaller number of informal sector workers. But the associated rise in 
informal sector income per worker in turn affects formal sector wages and squeezes profits, 
with negative effects on saving and accumulation. A rise in the saving rate out of profits or 
in public/foreign saving has a direct positive effect on saving and accumulation. A rise in 
the saving rate out of profits has an additional, indirect effect: it reduces the demand for 
informal goods which reduces informal sector income per worker, weakens formal sector 
workers and raises the profit share.  
 
5.1. Dynamics  
The share of employment in the modern sector is given by ௅ಾ௅ ൌ
௨ఙ௄
஺௅ . The utilization rate 
and the technical coefficient ߪ are both constant, and from (8), (10) and (26) it follows that 
ቀ ௄஺௅ቁ
෣ ൌ ܭ෡ െ ܣመ െ ܮ෠ ൌ ܨ ቂ ௄஺௅ , ݏ, ߬ቃ െ ݂ሾݍሿ െ ݃ ൤ܨ ቂቀ
௄
஺௅ , ݏ, ߬ቁቃ൨ െ ݊ 
          ൌ ߯௖ ቂ ௄஺௅ , ݍ, ݏ, ߬ቃ;  ߯
௖
ଵ ൏ 0, ߯௖ଶ ൏ 0, ߯௖ଷ ൐ 0, ߯௖ସ ൐ 0      (27) 
                                                            
12 Of course, F is a function of the exogenous parameters ߜ and ߪ as well. These parameters play no role for 
our argument, however, and we leave them out to simplify the notation. The same omission is made in 
equations (34) and (35) below. 
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The differential equation (27) has at most one positive stationary solution for given values 
of ݍ, ݏ, and ߬. The existence of a positive solution for ௄஺௅ requires that its growth rate is 
positive as its level tends to zero, lim௄ ஺௅⁄ ⟶଴ ߯௖ ቂ
௄
஺௅ , ݍ, ݏ, ߬ቃ ൐ 0, and that its growth rate is 
negative as its level tends to infinite, lim௄ ஺௅⁄ ⟶ஶ ߯௖ ቂ
௄
஺௅ , ݍ, ݏ, ߬ቃ ൏ 0. The second of these 
conditions is satisfied for all economically reasonable specifications. If the first condition 
fails to be satisfied, a low profit share (even when the modern sector is small), and low 
saving rates prevent accumulation from keeping up with the growth in the labor force in 
efficiency units. Modernization/industrialization becomes impossible, and the share of the 
formal sector converges to zero, ௄஺௅ → 0.  This ‘development trap’ may apply to some 
economies, but not, perhaps, to middle income countries that have already achieved a 
certain degree of industrialization. Thus, we assume the existence of a well-defined, non-
trivial stationary solution. 
The sign of ߯௖ଵ ensures that the stationary solution is stable for given values of ݍ, 
ݏ, and ߬, and we have 
௄
஺௅ → ߶
௖ሾݍ, ݏ, ߬ሿ;  ߶௖ଵ ൏ 0, ߶௖ଶ ൐ 0, ߶௖ଷ ൐ 0                  (28) 
Using the expressions for ܣመ and ܮ෠ (equations (8) and (10)), and the convergence result for  
௄
஺௅ , the accumulation rate associated with the stationary solution satisfies the condition 
ܭ෡ െ ݃ൣܭ෡൧ ൌ ݂ሾݍሿ ൅ ݊    (29) 
24 
 
The ݃-function describes the Verdoorn effect and, by assumption, ݃ᇱ ൏ 1. Thus, the left-
hand side of equation (29) is strictly increasing in ܭ෡, and it follows that13 
lim௧→ஶ ෠ܻ ൌ lim௧→ஶ ෠ܻெ ൌ lim௧→ஶ ܭ෡ ൌ ߠሾݍሿ;    ߠᇱ ൌ
௙ᇱ
ଵି௚ᇱ ൐ 0           (30) 
Substituting the result (30) into equation (10) and using the aggregate production 
function (11) and equation (29), we get (asymptotic) expressions for ܣመ and  ܮ෠ெ:  
lim௧→ஶ ܣመ ൌ ݂ሾݍሿ ൅ ݃ൣߠሾݍሿ൧;  ݂ᇱ ൐ 0,  
ௗ௚
ௗ௤ ൐ 0           (31) 
lim௧→ஶ ܮ෠ெ ൌ ݊                          (32) 
The profit share can be derived using equations (25) and (30). We have 
 	ݏߨߪ െ ሺߜ െ ߬ሻ ൌ ߠሾݍሿ    (33) 
Hence,  
ߨ ൌ ఏሾ௤ሿାఋିఛ௦ఙ ൌ ܩ
௖ሾݍ, ݏ, ߬ሿ;       ܩ௖ଵ ൐ 0, ܩ௖ଶ ൏ 0, ܩ௖ଷ ൏ 0  (34) 
and (since  ௪ಿ஺  is inversely related to the profit share),    
௪ಿ
஺ ൌ ܪ
௖ሾݍ, ݏ, ߬ሿ;  ܪ௖ଵ ൏ 0, ܪ௖ଶ ൐ 0, ܪ௖ଷ ൐ 0            (35) 
  The share of modern-sector employment is equal to ఙ௄஺௅ , and the asymptotic value of 
௄
஺௅ is given by (28). The underemployment rate in the informal sector and the average, 
economy-wide unemployment rate have been left open, however.  The average income in 
the informal sector is determined by the equilibrium condition (18). But ߱ே is the product 
of the price ݌ே and the effective employment rate e.  If the value of  
௣ಿ
஺  is constant, all 
adjustments in wage ratio ௪ಿ஺ 		happen through variations in the employment rate e. A 
                                                            
13  The first equality – the result for the growth rate of aggregate real output -- follows from the constancy 
(asymptotically) of the profit share. This constancy implies that the value of output in the informal sector 
grows at the same rate as that of the formal sector (equation (19)). 
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constant value of the employment rate e, by contrast, implies that informal-sector prices 
absorb all variations in ௪ಿ஺ . Neither of these extremes is likely to be accurate; an increase in 
௪ಿ
஺  may be expected to raise both the employment rate and the price of the informal good. 
In this intermediate case, we have 
݁ ൌ ݈ ቂ௪ಿ஺ ቃ ൌ ݈ൣܪ
௖ሾݍ, ݏ, ߬ሿ൧; ݈ᇱܪ௖ଵ ൏ 0, ݈ᇱܪ௖ଶ ൐ 0, ݈ᇱܪ௖ଷ ൐ 0      (36) 
The effective employment rate in the economy as a whole (ߝ) is determined by the degree 
of underemployment in the informal sector and the share of workers in the informal sector: 
ߝ ൌ ௅ಾାா௅ ൌ
௅ಾ
௅ ൅ ݁ ቀ1 െ
௅ಾ
௅ ቁ  
    ൌ ߪ߶௖ሾݍ, ݏ, ߬ሿ ൅ ݈ൣܪ௖ሾݍ, ݏ, ߬ሿ൧ሺ1 െ ߪ߶௖ሾݍ, ݏ, ߬ሿሻ	          (37) 
 
5. 2. Asymptotic effects 
The asymptotic effects of changes in the value of q can be found using the results in (30)-
(37). A relaxation of credit constraints, a rise in ݍ, unambiguously raises the long-run rate 
of growth of the modern sector --equation (30)-- and boosts productivity growth --equation 
(31). Faster productivity growth, in turn, generates faster growth in real wages. There are 
also effects on income distribution and unemployment, however, and these effects are less 
benign.  
The profit share increases --equation (34)--, and both the wage share in the modern 
sector and the employment rate fall. The fall in the wage share follows directly from the 
rise in the profit share. The decline in the employment rate follows from the negative 
impact of q on both the employment share in the modern sector and the effective 
employment rate in the informal sector --equations (36)-(37)--. The rise in the profit share, 
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finally, may increase wage inequality by raising the wage premium in the modern sector --
equation (20) and footnote 11. 
The distribution and employment effects are quite intuitive. If the growth rates of 
labor productivity and output increase, capital accumulation has to keep pace, and this 
requires an increase in the profit share. An increase in the profit share, in turn, requires a 
weakening of the bargaining position of formal-sector workers. This weakening is achieved 
through a decline in the proportion of the labor force that works in the formal sector, and as 
workers get pushed into the informal sector, the rate of underemployment tends to rise. 
Strong firm-level evidence that credit constraints influence investment need not 
imply macroeconomic effects on the level of aggregate saving and investment. In this 
classical model, however, a rise in the saving rates --the private rate s and/or the 
public/foreign rate ߬-- could counteract the negative effects on distribution and 
employment. The private saving rate has been taking as invariant in the face of changes in 
financial constraints. That need not be accurate. The saving rate could receive a stimulus 
from the relaxation of credit constraints if innovating firms have a relatively high saving 
rate. But a relaxation of households’ credit constraints could also raise consumption and 
reduce the saving rate, and a priori there is no reason to expect that the net effect on saving 
will be positive.  
As an alternative, public or foreign saving could adjust; the value of ߬ could 
increase. Insofar as persistent trade deficits become unsustainable, the rise in ߬ would have 
to come via reductions in the budget deficit (increases in ሺܶ െ ܩሻ ܭ⁄ ሻ). Adjustments of this 
kind in the government deficit are possible but depend on policy; they do not happen 
automatically. 
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5. 3. Medium-run effects 
The asymptotic effects in section 5.2 can be a poor guide to the short- and medium-run 
effects, especially for economies whose initial position is far from the stationary solution.  
The financial indicator q does not appear in the expression for the rate of 
accumulation --equation (26)--, and the increase in the asymptotic accumulation rate is 
brought about by the reduction in the stationary value of the share of modern sector 
employment and the associated higher value of the profit share. Thus, the rate of 
accumulation does not respond immediately to changes in q, and if the profit share 
responds slowly to the change in productivity growth, the medium run-effect on 
accumulation will be modest. This slow response is likely in economies with a small share 
of modern-sector employment and high rate of underemployment. The profit share 
increases because faster productivity growth gradually pushes workers into the informal 
sector, putting downward pressure on informal sector incomes. If the employment share in 
the formal sector is small, however, even large increases in productivity will generate only 
a minor proportional increase in the number of workers in the informal sector (see 
Appendix B for a formal analysis of this result). 
  The growth of output is of greater importance than the accumulation rate from a 
welfare perspective, but the conclusion is similar. The growth rate of real output (in terms 
of modern goods) is given by 
෠ܻ ൌ ௣ಿ௒ಿ	௒ 	൫݌ே ேܻ෣൯	+		
௒ಾ
௒ 	 ෠ܻெ              (38) 
Equation (17) can be used to derive the following expression for the growth rate of the 
informal sector: 
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݌ே ேܻ෣ ൌ
ି௦
ଵି௦గ೟
ߨሶ ௧	+		෡ܻெ             (39) 
Using 	 ෠ܻெ=ܭ෡, and substituting (39) into (38), thus, we have 
෠ܻ ൌ ௣ಿ௒ಿ	௒ 	
ି௦
ଵି௦గ೟
ߨሶ ௧ ൅ ܭ෡             (40) 
Equation (40) implies that the growth rate of output will follow accumulation closely as 
long as the profit share remains roughly constant; that is, an alleviation of credit constraints 
may have little or no effect on the growth rate in the medium run. 
 
6.  A Keynesian closure 
Different from the classical version, in which investment is determined passively by saving, 
firms make active investment and pricing decisions in the Keynesian version of the model. 
We assume that profit motives drive the decisions.  
Firms want to invest only if they expect that adding extra capacity will increase 
their profits. This condition, which holds independently of whether or not firms are credit 
constrained, fails to be satisfied if firms have undesired excess capacity. Credit constraints 
do not prevent a fall in investment, and firms would reduce their accumulation rates if 
utilization rates were to stay below their desired rate; credit constrained firms, however, 
could be forced to operate at high utilization rates. As a first approximation the profit 
condition can be expressed, therefore, as a relation between the long-run average rate of 
utilization and the performance of the financial system (as measured by q). Formally, 
ݑ ൌ ݑሾݍሿ;   ݑሾݍሿ ൒ ݑത,		ݑ′ ൏ 0               (41) 
where ݑത is the desired rate in the absence of credit constraints.  
Harrodian models typically produce local instability of the warranted path, but our 
focus in this paper is on medium- and long-run growth, and we shall assume that although 
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local instability may generate fluctuations, the fluctuations take place around the warranted 
path.14 Given this assumption, both our classical and Keynesian closures treat average 
utilization as structurally determined in the long run; it is equal to one in the classical 
version and determined by financial conditions (and other structural features, including the 
firm-level volatility of demand and the degree of competition) in the Keynesian version.  
The critical difference between the two closures shows up in the pricing/output 
decision. A constant utilization rate implies that the rate of accumulation is equal to the rate 
of growth of output, and output growth is determined passively in the classical model so as 
to satisfy the IS condition. In Keynesian/Kaleckian/Kaldorian theories, by contrast, firms 
make active pricing/output decisions.  
A Kaleckian benchmark model has a fixed markup, but pricing/output decisions, 
more generally, can take the form of a positive relation between the growth rate and the 
markup (Skott 1989, Skott and Zipperer 2012), 
෠ܻெ ൌ ݄ሾߨ,… ሿ;   ݄ଵ ൐ 0                       (42) 
The specification in (42) includes a fixed Kaleckian markup as a limiting, special case: 
let	݄ሾߨ଴, … ሿ ൌ 0	and	݄ଵ → ∞ for ߨ → ߨ଴, where ߨ ൌ ߨ଴ is the profit share associated with 
the fixed markup.  The positive relation between the growth rate and the profit share (the 
markup) may reflect adjustment costs associated with fast growth (including Penrose 
effects derived from limited managerial capabilities) as well as the alleviation of financing 
constraints when profits are high.   
                                                            
14 The instability may be curtailed by economic policy, an elastic demand for exports or some other 
mechanism.  Alternatively, multiple equilibria and a stable high-growth equilibrium are possible in dual 
economies; see Nakatani and Skott (2007) for an analysis along these lines of Japanese growth in the early 
post WW2 period when the Japanese economy had large amounts of hidden unemployment.  
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The growth relation (42) may contain additional variables, including a measure of 
the credit constraints: insofar as credit constraints hold back the expansion of some firms 
(the flip side of the inverse relation between q and the utilization rate), improvements in the 
financial system (increases in q) also stimulate growth.15 Thus, let the growth rate of output 
be given by 
෠ܻெ ൌ ݄ሾߨ, ݍሿ;    ݄ଵ ൐ 0, ݄ଶ ൐ 0            (43) 
   From equation (43) and the equality between ෠ܻெ and  ܭ෡ it follows that (except by 
fluke) the ex ante IS condition will no longer be consistent with an exogenously given 
value of ߬ and the determination of the profit share by equation (21). Formally,  
෠ܻெ ൌ ݄ሾߨ, ݍሿ ≷
ௌ
௄ െ ሺߜ െ ߬ሻ    (44) 
The ex post accounting relation must hold --we must have ܫ ൌ ܵ ൅ ሺܶ െ ܩሻ ൅ ሺܯ െ ܺሻ--  
and if the profit share is determined by equation (21), there are two possibilities.    
Induced shifts in the h-function, first, may adjust the rate of growth of output and 
ensure that ݄ሾߨ, ݍሿ ൌ ௌ௄ െ ሺߜ െ ߬); policy makers, for instance, may react to weak aggregate 
demand and sluggish growth by offering investment subsidies or by interventions that 
increase the degree of competition. Whatever the adjustment mechanism, this scenario 
effectively recovers the classical closure: accumulation is determined by the saving 
function on the right hand side of (44).   
Adjustments in the elements on the right hand side of (44), second, may allow 
accumulation to be determined by the h-function. The simplest way for this to happen is to 
                                                            
15  Skott (1989) includes the employment rate as an indicator of labor market conditions and determinant of 
growth. In the model in this paper, however, the profit share reflects conditions in the labor market, and 
including the share of formal-sector employment as an additional variable in the h-function would not affect 
the qualitative analysis. 
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have the trade balance do the adjusting. In this case, the domestic saving rate remains 
unchanged, and the IS relation simply serves to determine the trade balance; that is, 
ܺ െܯ ൌ ܵ െ ܫ ൅ ܶ െ ܩ ൌ ܵ െ ݄ሾߨ, ݍሿܭ ൅ ܶ െ ܩ. Alternatively, an accommodating 
domestic saving rate can be the result of induced changes in taxes and the government 
budget or of interventions that affect the private saving rate (restrictions on consumer 
lending, for instance). The equilibrium condition for the informal good (and thereby the 
determination of informal-sector wages and the profit share in the formal sector) is 
unaffected as long as the structure of taxes and government consumption takes the form 
described in section 4.3.16  
 
6.1. Dynamics 
As in section 5.1, we examine the dynamics for the employment share ௅ಾ௅ ൌ
௨ሺ௤ሻఙ௄
஺௅ .  The 
profit share in the formal sector is still given by equation (21), and if q and hence u are 
constant, we have 
 ቀ௨ሾ௤ሿ௄஺௅ ቁ
෣ ൌ ܭ෡ െ ܣመ െ ܮ෠ ൌ ݄ሾߨ, ݍሿ െ ݂ሾݍሿ െ ݃ൣ݄ሾߨ, ݍሿ൧ െ ݊     
                      ൌ ݄ ቂ߮ ቂ௨ሾ௤ሿ௄஺௅ , ݏቃ , ݍቃ െ ݂ሾݍሿ െ ݃ ൤݄ ቂ߮ ቂ
௨ሾ௤ሿ௄
஺௅ , ݏቃ , ݍቃ൨ െ ݊           
              ൌ ߯௞ ቂ௨ሾ௤ሿ௄஺௅ , ݍ, ݏቃ;	 ߯ଵ
௞ ൏ 0,		߯ଶ௞ ൌ ݄ଶെ݂ᇱ െ ݃ଶᇱ ݄ଶ ⋛ 0,		߯ଷ௞ ൐ 0												ሺ45ሻ 
                                                            
16  Non-zero values for the trade and/or public deficit will generate movements in the stocks of foreign and 
public debt. In a more elaborate model, these movements in financial stocks produce feedback effects on the 
private sector’s saving decisions. High (low) private sector saving rates are associated with trade surpluses 
and public deficits (trade deficits and public surpluses), and the resulting gradual increase (decrease) in the 
private sector wealth to income ratio will tend to reduce (raise) the private saving rate.  Ryoo and Skott (2013) 
analyze stock-flow adjustments of this kind for a closed, one-sector economy. 
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As in the classical case, there is a negative feedback from the level of  ௨ሾ௤ሿ௄஺௅ 	  to its rate of 
change, and the differential equation (45) has a unique, stable solution: 
௨ሾ௤ሿ௄
஺௅ → ߶
௞ሾݍ, ݏሿ;  ߶ଵ௞ ⋛ 0 iff			݄ଶെ݂ᇱ െ ݃ଶᇱ ݄ଶ ⋛ 0,	߶ଶ௞ ൐ 0            (46) 
Following the same steps as in the analysis of the classical case, we have ܭ෡ െ ݃ൣܭ෡൧ ൌ
݂ሾݍሿ ൅ ݊ at the stationary solution. Hence, 
lim௧→ஶ ෠ܻ ൌ lim௧→ஶ ෠ܻெ ൌ lim௧→ஶ ܭ෡ ൌ ߠሾݍሿ;    ߠᇱ ൐ 0       
           (47) 
lim௧→ஶ ܣመ ൌ ݂ሾݍሿ ൅ ݃ൣߠሾݍሿ൧;   ݂ᇱ ൐ 0,  
ௗ௚
ௗ௤ ൐ 0                                 
(48) 
lim௧→ஶ ܮ෠ெ ൌ ݊                                                 
(49) 
The results in (47)-(49) for technical change and the growth rates of output, capital 
and employment are identical to those for the classical case. The implications for income 
distribution and unemployment can be qualitatively different in the Keynesian model, 
however. Asymptotically we have 
 	݄ሾߨ, ݍሿ െ ݃ൣ݄ሾߨ, ݍሿ൧ ൌ ݂ሾݍሿ ൅ ݊	    (50) 
Hence, using the implicit function theorem, 
ߨ ൌ ܩ௞ሾݍሿ where ܩ௞ᇱ ⋛ 0 if ݂ᇱ ⋛ ݄௤ െ ݃′݄௤           (51) 
and    
௪ಿ
஺ ൌ ܪ
௞ሾݍሿ where ܪ௞ᇱ ⋛ 0 if ݄௤ െ ݃′݄௤ ⋛ ݂ᇱ  (52) 
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Still following the same reasoning as in section 5.1, the effective employment rate in the 
informal sector and the overall employment rate are given by  
݁ ൌ ݈ ቂ௪ಿ஺ ቃ ൌ ݈ቂܪ
௞ሾݍሿቃ;  ݈ᇱܪ௞′ ൏ 0                         (53) 
 ߝ ൌ ߶௞ሾݍ, ݏሿ ൅ 	݈ቂܪ௞ሾݍሿቃሺ1 െ ߶௞ሾݍ, ݏሿሻ   (54) 
 
6.2. Asymptotic effects 
Unlike in the classical case, an increase in the performance of the financial system --a rise 
in q-- may lead to improvements in employment and income distribution, as well as to an 
increase in the rate of growth. Comparing (52), (53) and (54), the same crucial condition 
ensures that both the employment rate and the distribution of income improve following a 
rise in q: 
݄௤ ൐ ݂ᇱ ൅ ݃ᇱ݄௤             (55) 
Intuitively, the effect of a rise in q on the growth rate of output and accumulation must be 
larger than the effect on productivity growth. The partial derivative ݄௤ describes the effect 
on output growth and accumulation. The effect on productivity is the sum of the direct 
diffusion effect (f’) and the indirect effect via Verdoorn’s law (݃ᇱ݄௤). The condition (55) 
can be re-written as  
݄௤ ൐
௙ᇲ
ଵି௚ᇲ              (56) 
Expressed in this way, the condition says that employment and income distribution suffer if 
a weakening of workers is needed in order to raise the growth rate of output in the modern 
sector to the new equilibrium level. 
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In the Keynesian scenario, the saving rate plays no role in the determination of the 
distribution of income and the effective employment rate in the informal sector (equations 
(51)-(53). This result may seem surprising: the saving rate influences the demand for 
informal goods, and one might expect this influence to feed into an effect on the average 
income in the informal sector.  The influence, however, is neutralized by the endogenous 
determination of the composition of employment. An increase in the saving rate, which 
reduces demand for the informal good, is associated with a reduction in the share of 
informal-sector employment, which raises average income in the informal sector. The two 
forces offset each other in this model; the net effect, however, need not be zero with a 
different specification of functional forms (a relaxation, for instance, of the fixed 
composition of domestic consumption with a constant share going to informal goods). The 
saving rate does influence the overall rate of employment. A rise in ݏ increases overall 
employment: it raises the share of workers in the modern sector and underemployment is 
concentrated in the informal sector. 
 
6.3. Medium-run effects 
Firms’ pricing/output decisions are critical in the Keynesian version of the model and the 
growth function (43), which describes the pricing/output decisions, includes the financial 
variable q. Thus, unlike in the classical closure, a rise in q provides an immediate boost to 
the growth rate of modern-sector output and thereby accumulation. This effect applies 
independently of any additional, gradual effects via the induced changes in employment 
shares and the profit share.  
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The combined public/ foreign saving rate acts as the accommodating variable in the 
Keynesian closure. Persistent trade deficits are likely to provoke a foreign exchange crisis – 
the Mexican experience provides several examples – and sustainable growth therefore may 
require adjustments in fiscal policy. Specifically, an increase in the growth rate, whether 
caused by an alleviation in credit constraints or other exogenous shifts, should be 
accompanied by medium-run policies to reduce the fiscal deficit. This conclusion, which 
may seem ‘non-Keynesian’, is perfectly consistent with ‘functional finance’.17 There may 
be underemployment in our medium-run Keynesian version of a dual economy, but the 
underemployment is the result of shortages of capital. Aggregate demand policy may be 
needed for short-run stabilization (a potentially complicated task that we have deliberately 
abstracted from, focusing instead on medium- and long-run positions with utilization at the 
desired rate) but to avoid unsustainable trade deficits, fiscal policy must make space for any 
increase in accumulation; the medium-run fiscal deficit must be smaller, the higher is the 
growth rate.  
 
7. Concluding Comments 
A large literature has identified credit constraints as a key source of sluggish economic 
growth in Mexico, and several studies, including Gómez-Ramírez (2015), offer firm-level 
evidence showing that credit constraints have reduced investment. But the firm-level data 
do not necessarily imply adverse effects for aggregate investment and productivity, and 
despite the emphasis on credit constraints in the literature, there has been little theoretical 
work. This paper contributes to filling this lacuna.  
                                                            
17 Skott (2016) discusses functional finance in a mature, labor-constrained economy. 
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Economies with full employment need an increasing labor supply in efficiency units 
in order to grow. There is no such requirement under conditions of pervasive hidden 
unemployment.  In a dual economy, economic growth does not require productivity growth 
in the modern sector. The presence of underutilized resources in the informal sector, 
implies that fast growth in per capita income can be achieved by mobilizing these 
resources: average incomes go up if the accumulation of capital makes previously 
underemployed workers move into the formal sector. In this sense, accumulation is the 
proximate source of economic growth, and arguably the most formidable task facing 
developing economies is to mobilize underemployed resources.18  
Our analysis has shown how an alleviation of credit constraints can raise long-run 
growth through their impact on productivity growth in the modern sector. But we also find 
that employment in the formal sector may fall and inequality increase, even in the long run. 
Moreover, in the classical version of the model the growth rate need not rise in the short 
and medium run, and in the Keynesian version additional policies may be needed to prevent 
balance of payments problems. These medium-run results arguably are of greater real-
world relevance than the asymptotic results. It should be noted also that other factors may 
affect the growth function and the rate of accumulation, and an exclusive focus on financial 
constraints as the impediment to growth may be misguided. An increase in the degree of 
goods market competition, for instance, will tend to raise the growth rate associated with 
any given profit share (Skott 1989).  
                                                            
18 The East Asian countries were spectacularly successful in this respect, sustaining high growth rates for 
several decades, despite having “estimated total factor productivity growth rates that are closely approximated 
by the historical performance of many of the OECD and Latin American economies” (Young 1995, p. 641). 
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It would be nonsensical to advocate credit constraints and slow productivity growth 
because of the potential benefits for employment and income distribution. The point is 
different. Our analysis suggests that a relaxation of credit constraints needs to be 
supplemented by other policies in order to simultaneously achieve faster economic growth 
in the medium run, reductions in inequality and underemployment, and a sustainable 
trajectory for the trade balance. 
The saving rate is of particular importance in the classical model but also plays a 
role in our Keynesian model. An increase in saving out of profits is beneficial in a classical 
model because it frees up resources that can be used to expand the modern sector. In a 
Keynesian model, concerns about the effects of an increase in saving rates out of profits on 
aggregate demand would be valid if luxury consumption were the only way to boost 
demand. This is not the case. If private investment does not fill the gap after an increase in 
saving, aggregate demand can be maintained through much-needed public investment in 
infrastructure and education (with added benefits in terms of crowding in of private 
investment as well as productivity growth).  
The analysis has obvious limitations. Three areas, in particular, call for further 
work. Our neglect of investment in the informal sector, first, may be misleading. The 
informal sector is less capital intensive than the formal sector, but it does use capital, and 
credit constraints may bite particularly hard in the informal sector.19  The delineation of 
informal and formal sectors, second, changes over time. Retailing activities, for instance, 
                                                            
19 If credit constraints in small, informal sector businesses are critical, reductions in inequality could help 
alleviate the credit constraints. Relatedly, some contributions seems to take as granted that inequality/poverty 
have been deterring human capital accumulation in contemporary Mexico; Levy (2006), Levy and Walton 
(2009), Esquivel (2015). This possibility (and its natural extension to physical capital), however, has not been 
thoroughly examined in the Mexican literature. Formal models of the interaction between inequality and 
human capital formation have been developed by Galor and Zeira (1993) and Benabou (1996), among others.  
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move from street vendors to supermarkets and department stores as the economy develops. 
These shifts have implications for the sectoral composition of consumption. Our 
assumption of fixed expenditure shares may be reasonable as a first approximation for the 
short and medium run, but changes in the delineation of the sectors make it less appealing 
for the long run.  
A growth strategy, third, may need to consider not just the prevalence of credit 
constraints and the overall growth of the modern sector. The manufacturing sector in 
Mexico is mainly export-oriented and it has grown rapidly in terms of gross output, 
especially after the post-reform era (as even contributions somewhat critical to the reform 
process have recognized; Moreno-Brid and Ros (2009), de Souza and Gómez-Ramírez 
(2017)). The shares of imported intermediate inputs in the overall economy and in the 
manufacturing sector in particular, however, have been increasing even more dramatically 
in the post-reform period, and this trend has reduced the growth rate of value added. The 
Mexican economy, from this perspective, has suffered from market-induced de-linking of 
the modern export sector from the rest of the domestic economy; there has been a “Mexican 
paradox of exports boom without growth” (de Souza and Gomez-Ramirez (2017)).  
Sectoral disaggregation is potentially important for other reasons too. Externalities and the 
scope of increasing returns to scale may differ across subsectors, and markets may 
misallocate investment, particularly in a developing economy (Skott and Larudee (1998) 
consider the Mexican case). National development banks may provide part of the solution 
(Levy (2007), Moreno-Brid (2013)). A formal analysis of these important questions would 
require further disaggregation of the traded sector.  
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Appendix A: Effects of differential saving and utilization rates 
Innovating firms may differ from their non-innovating counterparts with respect to both 
saving and utilization rates. Innovating firms, first, have better prospects for future profits 
and may invest a higher proportion of their current profits. If sh and sl are the investment 
(=saving) shares in innovating and non-innovating firms, and  ܭ௧
௛௜௚௛ and ܭ௧௟௢௪ denote the 
capital stock in high and low productivity firms, we have: 
ܭ௧
௛௜௚௛ ൌ ݔ෤ܭ௧               (A1) 
ܭ௧௟௢௪ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݔ෤ሻܭ௧              (A2) 
where  	ݔ෤ ൌ ௫௦
೓
௫௦೓ାሺଵି௫ሻ௦೗  and  ܭ௧ ൌ ∑ ݇௜௧௜ . 
Innovating firms, second, may want to expand fast and are likely therefore to be 
affected more strongly by credit constraints. The average utilization rates may therefore be 
different for innovating and non-innovating firms. If ݑூ and ݑேூ denote the utilization rates 
for innovators and non-innovators, the production function (11) and equations (A1)-(A2) 
imply that average labor productivity in the modern sector is given by 
ܣ௧ ൌ
∑ ܣ௜௧݈௜௧௜
∑ ݈௜௧௜
ൌ
ݔ෤ݑூߪܭ௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݔ෤ሻݑேூߪܭ௧
ݔ෤ݑூߪܭ௧
expሺܽ௧ ൅ ܾሻ
൅ ሺ1 െ ݔ෤ሻݑ
ேூߪܭ௧
expሺܽ௧ሻ
 
 ൌ ୣ୶୮	ሺ௔೟ା௕ሻ௫෤෨ାሺଵି௫෤ሻୣ୶୮	ሺ௕ሻ 
where  ݔ෤෨ ൌ ௫෤௨
಺
௫෤௨಺ାሺଵି௫෤ሻ௨ಿ಺ ൏ 1.     
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Appendix B: (In-) sensitivity of the profit share to changes in modern sector 
productivity 
Consider the simple case with a constant wage premium. We have 
 ߨ௧ ൌ 1 െ
ఠಾ೟
஺೟
ൌ 1 െ ߤ	 1െߙߙ ሺ1 െ ݏߨݐሻ ൭
ݑݐߪܭݐ
ܣݐܮݐ
1െݑݐߪܭݐܣݐܮݐ
൱   (B1) 
or 
ߨ௧ ൌ
ଵିఓ	భషഀഀ ቌ
ೠ೟഑಼೟
ಲ೟ಽ೟
భషೠ೟഑಼೟ಲ೟ಽ೟
ቍ
ଵି௦ఓ	భషഀഀ ቌ
ೠ೟഑಼೟
ಲ೟ಽ೟
భషೠ೟഑಼೟ಲ೟ಽ೟
ቍ
    (B2) 
If u is constant (ݑ ൌ 1 in the classical case and ݑ ൌ ݑሾݍሿ in the Keynesian case), equation 
(B2) implies that 
ߨሶ ൌ
߲ߨ
߲ ݑ௧ߪܭ௧ܣ௧ܮ௧
߲ ݑ௧ߪܭ௧ܣ௧ܮ௧
߲ݐ ൌ
߲ߨ
߲ ݑ௧ߪܭ௧ܣ௧ܮ௧
ݑ௧ߪܭ௧
ܣ௧ܮ௧
൫ܭ෡ െ ܣመ െ ܮ෠൯ 
ൌ െሼ
ሺଵି௦ሻఓ	భషഀഀ
቎ଵି௦ఓ	భషഀഀ ቌ
ೠ഑಼೟
ಲ೟ಽ೟
భషೠ഑಼೟ಲ೟ಽ೟
ቍ቏
మ
ଵ
൬ଵିೠ഑಼೟ಲ೟ಽ೟ ൰
మ ൫ܭ෡ െ ܣመ െ ܮ෠൯ሽ
௨ఙ௄೟
஺೟௅೟
    (B3) 
The term in curly brackets is bounded, and the expression for ߨሶ  goes to zero if  ௨ఙ௄೟஺೟௅೟  goes to 
zero. 
